Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, yet this does not mean there is no way to get its diplomats out of office.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the UN General Assembly last week, despite objections from Russia and its allies, and raised a long overdue question: why does Russia still have a veto at the UN Security Council?

On two occasions in the past, the UN has taken interim measures to modify or limit the participation of member states when the organization deems it necessary. Similar improvisations, adapted to the current situation, can work again.

In 1971 the UN General Assembly voted to grant a seat in the UN to the Beijing government, effectively removing Taiwan from it. Three years later, the assembly declared that the South African government no longer had the right to speak or vote at the assembly. In both cases, the General Assembly did not follow what is set out in the UN Charter. Instead, it relies on the creative use of credentialing procedures, i.e., the seemingly esoteric procedures that determine if a member state is given a seat.

What is the rationale for voting on the matter of Russia's Security Council? How will such a vote work? Why is granting the Ukrainian representative the right solution to fill the vacant seat if Russia is removed?

According to Article 23(1) of the UN Charter, “the Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council”. Since December 1991, the seat of the Soviet Union was filled by the representative of the Russian Federation. The text of Article 23(1) has not changed since then.

International legal practitioners often describe this state of affairs as automatic. However, that is not the case. When a Russian representative filled the seat of the Soviet Union, that was the result of an agreement. The agreement, both tacit and explicit, is part of Russia's overall peaceful transition to a new political order and Russia's largely seamless inheritance of a host of Soviet rights, privileges, and assets.

There are other possible outcomes. As of December 1991, although no one was pursuing the possibility at the time, in addition to Russia, there were two other UN member states suitable in principle to fill the Soviet Security Council seats. Both Ukraine and Belarus were former Soviet republics, and both were UN founding members. None of the other UN members negotiated in Yalta in 1945 and were accepted in San Francisco were part of the former Soviet republic and original membership of the UN.

Yet among these two member states. Belarus has been aiding and assisting Russia's invasion of Ukraine since February 2022, and therefore disqualifies itself by any reasonable measure.

This made Ukraine the only founding member of the UN who remains faithful to the organization's principles, and who is also a former member of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it has a credible claim to the seat.

To realize this, the first step is for Ukraine to issue a document to one of its diplomats to fill the Soviet’s seat. There is no doubt that the Russian representative will insist that he, not the Ukrainian, should keep the seat. However, other Council members are free to object to Russia's presence.

Here, the credentials rule, rarely mentioned by the Security Council, will come into play. In accordance with rule 17 of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure:

“Any representative on the Security Council, to whose credentials objection has been made within the Security Council, shall continue to sit with the same rights as other representatives until the Security Council has decided the matter”.

Therefore, the Russian representative will "continue to sit" on the Security Council until a decision is made. The decision on this matter, that is, against the credentials of a representative of the Security Council, falls within the scope of the rules on matters of procedure. These are decided by a 9-member majority of the 15-member council. Such matters cannot be vetoed under Article 27(2), of the UN Charter. Russia will be powerless.

Is there any reason for this? As it happens, there is. The Security Council will be asked to review Russia's original agreement to fill the Soviet seat and to draw attention to Russia's subsequent violations of that agreement. In December 1991, Russia agreed to respect the UN Charter, specifically the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors. Russia has expressed the same intention in many other forums and instruments, including in the Alma Ata Protocol and the Budapest Memorandum. In return, Russia received a number of significant benefits, including the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear assets and the former Soviet Union's space infrastructure, and the right to represent the Soviet Union under Article 23(1) of the Security Council.

The resolution of state continuity and succession issues in the 1990s was very much to Russia's liking, achieved through highly tailored transactions rather than the automatic application of general international law. An important and integral element of the solution is Russia's agreement to accept the sovereign borders of its neighbors and never use force or threats against them.

Russia has seriously violated this commitment through its invasion of Ukraine, so its presence in the Security Council has lost its legal basis. The Security Council has procedural tools to deal with Russian violations and recognize Ukraine's allegiance to the UN Charter.

If it wishes to affirm the vitality of itself and the UN as a whole, then the Council should use these tools with no postponement.