On October 4, 2025, Japan witnessed a historic political moment, where Sanae Takaichi was elected President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and in ten days' time, she will become Japan's first female Prime Minister. Her election marks a significant milestone in the gender history of Japanese politics and represents an unprecedented step forward. Takaichi's rise not only breaks the long-standing male dominance in Japanese political leadership but also draws widespread international attention to the future trajectory of Japan's political landscape.

As for her political stance, Takaichi has been closely associated with the label of a "hardline conservative" since the beginning of her political career. Entering politics in 1993 as an independent candidate in the House of Representatives election, she campaigned advocating building a "strong Japan" and was successfully elected. She joined the LDP in 1996 and became a member of the Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai (Seiwa Policy Research Council), gradually emerging as a key figure within the party's conservative faction. At times, she has even been dubbed "Japan's Trump".

Since entering politics, Takaichi gradually gained the strong trust of Shinzo Abe and, during his tenure, became a key figure at the core of Japan's conservative bloc. Following Abe's assassination, she positioned herself as the rightful heir to his political legacy, earning broad support within the LDP. Takaichi's far-right political agenda is marked by several defining positions. In economic policy, she supports continuing the principles of "Abenomics", favoring large-scale public spending and ultra-loose monetary policies such as low interest rates. On constitutional issues, she advocates revising Japan's pacifist Constitution to formally incorporate the Self-Defense Forces into Article 9, and she strongly insists on maintaining a patrilineal male succession system for the Imperial Family, opposing the idea of a reigning empress. In terms of historical recognition, she denies Japan's past acts of aggression and colonial rule. In foreign affairs, she adopts a staunchly pro-American stance, has repeatedly made remarks critical of China, and expresses a generally exclusionary attitude toward foreigners.

Following her election victory, many analysts suggest that once Takaichi officially takes office, she is likely to fully implement her policy agenda, effectively translating Abe's legacy into concrete policy frameworks. In terms of Japan-China relations, her rise to power marks the beginning of a more complex phase characterized by heightened military tensions, deepening economic and security confrontations, and broader spillover effects from the regional security landscape. These three dimensions are expected to gradually converge, forming a new strategic dynamic. Future relations between Japan and China will go beyond bilateral military posturing, becoming increasingly entangled in the structural competition underpinning the U.S.-Japan alliance and the wider Indo-Pacific strategic architecture, which means it is likely to result in a continued deterioration of Japan-China bilateral ties.

In response to this development, ANBOUND's founder Kung Chan noted that Takaichi's rise to power will indeed add further uncertainty to Japan-China relations. However, the constraints she will face should not be underestimated. Under her administration, the more meaningful development may lie in Japan's foreign policy moving further toward an "Asian rebalancing".

First and foremost, managing the Japan–U.S. relationship will undoubtedly be Takaichi's top priority. From the perspective of core national interests, Japan's strategic objective is to safeguard national security while expanding its national interests. This involves maintaining the protective umbrella of the Japan–U.S. security alliance, while simultaneously seeking economic and technological benefits and carving out greater strategic autonomy.

Takaichi is likely to adopt a stance that is "relatively firm yet strategically resilient". This suggests she will avoid a confrontational rupture with the U.S., and instead work to narrow gaps in interests through institutionalized, multi-round negotiations and issue segmentation. On specific matters such as U.S. troop presence and defense cost-sharing, export controls on high-tech goods to Japan, supply chain restructuring, market access, and investment facilitation, she is expected to seek reciprocal arrangements, offering negotiable concessions in exchange for tangible gains. Takaichi may structure negotiations around a strategy of "high-frequency, incremental steps with long-term accumulation". This would involve breaking down high-stakes issues into smaller, manageable components and pursuing gains through technical agreements, framework-based understandings, and complementary economic policies aimed at maximizing Japan's national interest. At the same time, she may leverage domestic public opinion and parliamentary dynamics as tools to expand her negotiating space. Key constraints include uncertainties stemming from U.S. domestic politics, particularly the unpredictability of Trump-style leadership and domestic Japanese wariness of appearing either too confrontational or overly accommodating toward the United States. Observable indicators of this strategic posture might include the frequency with which economic topics are raised as bargaining chips in bilateral talks, the number of cases where defense cost-sharing negotiations are made public, and the scope of concessions and access gained in areas involving high-end technology exports.

Second, regarding Japan's ongoing efforts in recent years to modernize and expand its military capabilities, both security and economic motivations are at play. From this dual perspective, the expansion of defense production serves not only as a necessary response for deterrence and crisis preparedness but also as a powerful tool for industrial policy and job creation. Hence, this policy orientation is highly likely to continue. If Takaichi advances an even more ambitious defense buildup than in the past, she will likely adopt multi-year budget commitments to minimize annual political friction, link defense procurement with industrial subsidies to promote localized supply chains, and leverage military-civil fusion to drive the upgrading of high-end manufacturing sectors such as semiconductors, sensors, and artificial intelligence. In practical terms, she may prioritize the development of systems that enhance anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, strengthen maritime and aerial intelligence as well as command-and-control networks, and improve reserve mobilization and maritime logistics. At the same time, she may seek to loosen restrictions on weapons exports to enable large-scale production and greater international collaboration. Key constraints include sensitivities surrounding Japan's constitutional and postwar pacifist traditions, concerns over fiscal sustainability, and bottlenecks caused by reliance on foreign suppliers for critical components. As a result, the overall process is likely to unfold as a gradual liberalization accompanied by institutional safeguards. Observable indicators include the long-term trajectory of defense budget growth, the domestic share of defense procurement, the production capacity and employment data of defense contractors, and changes in the number of approved cases for overseas weapons sales.

Third, regarding Japan's policy stance on Taiwan, based on the first principles, when handling disputes with neighboring countries, a nation would seek to balance value expression and risk control. Takaichi has long upheld a "pro-Taiwan" position, but this does not necessarily mean that Japan would unconditionally push itself into direct conflict with Mainland China. A more realistic path may be focusing on strengthening non-military, substantive support, including deepening economic and trade ties, expanding parliamentary and civil exchanges, facilitating key technology and personnel exchanges with Taiwan, and closer, non-public intelligence and logistical cooperation. However, Japan would maintain ambiguity and restraint in terms of public military commitments and direct military intervention. Takaichi may use language and symbolic diplomatic actions to meet domestic political demands while lowering the risk of misjudgment through asymmetric, low-visibility support mechanisms. Constraints include the cost of direct confrontation with China and the potential for economic retaliation, as well as the fine balance Japan must carefully maintain between its alliance with the U.S. and the security of the Taiwan Strait. Key monitoring points include substantive adjustments in Taiwan-related exchange and investment policies, the activity level of parliamentary delegation visits to Taiwan, and the level of public visibility and depth of Japan's involvement in crisis situations. Analysts at ANBOUND believe that while Takaichi may occasionally make some surprising and "extreme" remarks, they are mostly limited to verbal expressions.

Fourth, regarding Takaichi's tenure in office, the main deciding factors are neither her ability nor will, but rather whether she can maintain a flexible policy stance between domestic and foreign affairs while delivering economic results. Compared to the political norm of constant changes of the Prime Minister, if Takaichi can solidify grassroots and key factions of the LDP support with a progressive, rather than radical, policy combination (such as through visible industrial outcomes, job creation, and local fiscal revitalization), the probability of extending her tenure will increase. On the contrary, if she is excessively tough on sensitive issues without offering alternative socio-economic benefits, she could face internal divisions and a backlash from public opinion. Therefore, her political survival strategy will likely involve steadily advancing policies that bring measurable benefits in exchange for voter patience; leaving room to retreat or handle high-risk issues in a technical manner; and consolidating factional support through local benefits and intra-party resource distribution. Observable variables include intra-party faction dynamics, unity in congressional votes, polling changes, and the results of local elections.

Fifth, regarding the possible future direction of Japan-China relations, China's understanding of Takaichi herself is probably not very thorough. However, because Takaichi needs to maintain close security ties with the United States while also having to consider China's massive economic relations, her policy towards China reflects a contradictory but predictable logic: adopting a tough stance when necessary to respond to domestic political demands or ally expectations, while maintaining pragmatic engagement in the face of broader economic and practical interests. For China, it is important not to underestimate her nor to simplify her as just another hardliner. The strategy should focus on patient, institutionalized, and interest-driven engagement: building positive mutual trust through sustained high-level dialogues, technological and industrial cooperation, and advocating for shared issues (such as climate change and regional economic cooperation) in multilateral forums. At the same time, China must be prepared for military and economic responses to avoid misjudgments. Constraints arise from emotional reactions to historical issues and territorial disputes between Japan and China, as well as the vulnerability of both countries' domestic politics in sending diplomatic signals. Key indicators for evaluating bilateral interactions include the frequency of high-level visits, the signing and cancellation of trade and economic cooperation projects, and the consistency or divergence of positions in regional mechanisms.

Sixth, Japan's potential "Asian Rebalancing" in its foreign policy should be taken seriously, as well as the process through which this shift may occur. Japan may view "rebalancing" as a transition from a security framework that is highly reliant on a single superpower to a more diversified regional positioning, with greater diplomatic and economic flexibility. This process is naturally gradual rather than revolutionary. Takaichi has a certain degree of foresight and will attempt to expand Japan's strategic autonomy while maintaining security ties with the United States. This could be achieved through economic cooperation, participation in regional institutions, and collaboration with ASEAN and China on functional issues (such as energy, infrastructure, climate, and supply chains). The concept of "Asian Rebalancing," which Kung Chan has frequently discussed in relation to the relations between Japan and China, essentially refers to the expansion and spread of Japan's strategic autonomy. Possible methods could include promoting regional economic projects, achieving complementary cooperation with neighboring countries in key industries, and advocating for crisis management mechanisms in security matters to reduce dependence on a single ally. The extent to which this process is realized depends on the intensity of U.S. economic and strategic expectations of Japan, Japan's domestic political tolerance for the risks of closer ties with China, and the trajectory of U.S.-China great power competition. Observable long-term signals include changes in Japan's stance in regional multilateral mechanisms, the quantity and quality of economic projects with China, and Japan's tendencies in choosing sides in cases of U.S.-Japan interest conflicts. Overall, "Asian Rebalancing" is not a rejection of the U.S. relationship, but a long-term adjustment aimed at a more flexible geopolitical strategy. Takaichi's election offers a potential opportunity, but its success or failure remains deeply constrained by the external great power dynamics and domestic political resilience.

Looking at Takaichi's policy orientation as a whole, economic issues remain a major focus. It is predicted that, like Donald Trump, Takaichi will choose the most easily actionable areas to begin implementing her policies, rather than tackling difficult and complex geopolitical fields first. A senior researcher at ANBOUND believes that the area Takaichi will focus on is the yen. She will aim to devalue the yen, making "Made in Japan" products cheaper. At the same time, this will likely trigger a stock market rally in Japan, greatly benefiting the corporate sector. In simple terms, it would be a revival of Abenomics.

Final analysis conclusion:

After Takaichi Sanae assumes office, her governance logic may reflect a mix of "toughness with flexibility, a pursuit of autonomy within U.S. dependence, and a tendency toward geopolitical rebalancing". Her policy framework will center on maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance, but she will strive to expand Japan's "incremental space" for national interests through negotiation and bargaining. Her focus will be on strengthening military capabilities and promoting the militarization of the defense industry as dual goals for both economic growth and national security. On the Taiwan issue, Takaichi will likely exercise caution in controlling the situation of relations, maintaining a symbolic pro-Taiwan stance to uphold her political position while avoiding substantial risks of direct intervention. Domestically, she will rely on policy flexibility and economic performance to extend her tenure in office. Regarding relations with China, although Takaichi may present a tough exterior, it is not ruled out that, driven by practical interests, she may engage in pragmatic interactions with China. This will be a key point to observe in the future evolution of Japan-China relations. On a deeper level, Takaichi's political trajectory may initiate a gradual process of "Asian Rebalancing". This means that Japan, while maintaining its alliance, will increasingly pursue strategic autonomy and regional leadership to gain more maneuvering space amid U.S.-China competition. Although this trend may not be immediately apparent, it could shape the direction of the East Asian geopolitical landscape over the next decade.