Since its operation, the China-Europe Railway Express has made significant progress as a key component of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and an essential hub for China's overland westward trade. It has not only deeply shaped the logistics landscape of the Eurasian continent but also profoundly impacted economic and trade exchanges between countries along its route. According to statistics, by July 2025, the cumulative number of trips, including returns, surpassed 110,000, with the monthly number of trains maintained at over 1,000 for 62 consecutive months. In the first eight months of 2025, the total cargo sent by the Central Asia-bound trains reached 751,000 TEUs, representing a year-on-year growth of over 20%. In terms of cargo types, the scope has expanded from initial small commodities to encompass over 50,000 goods in 26 categories, including photovoltaic panels, new energy vehicles, and cross-border e-commerce products. Although the overall transport capacity of land-based transportation is not comparable to sea freight, under continuous national efforts, the China-Europe Railway Express has become a vital artery for China's foreign trade.
However, the China-Europe Railway Express recently encountered an emergency situation. On September 12, the Polish government closed the Poland-Belarus border crossing, citing security measures against the “threats from Russian-Belarusian military exercises". Although in the joint document between China and Poland, released on September 15, the Polish side clearly stated that it would ensure the smooth passage of the China-Europe Railway Express, Poland maintained its position of blocking the border and, on September 18, it announced an indefinite closure, refusing to allow the resumption of the train service. While Poland lifted the blockade on the China-Europe Railway Express on September 25, it also declared that it reserved the right to close the passage again at any time. The northern route of the China-Europe Railway Express passes through Poland to reach the European hinterland, and the Małaszewicze border crossing in Poland is the largest transshipment hub for the railway in Europe, handling more than 90% of the transshipment and track-changing tasks. The closure of this border effectively paralyzed the operation of the China-Europe Railway Express. It is worth noting that in the period before and after consultations between the governments of China and Poland, Polish media repeatedly used phrases along the line of "the trade border must be closed due to China's position on Russia", reflecting how the geopolitical spillover of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly entered the realm of China-Europe trade.
It is worth noting that recently, the China-Iran railway has also been facing operational difficulties due to geopolitical tensions. Reports suggest that Israel, due to China's position on the Palestinian issue, has even listed the China-Iran railway as a target for strike, containment, and sabotage. Earlier, the Lithuanian government's resistance to China's foreign policy also caused severe restrictions on railway routes. While the various railway routes crossing the land-based "world island" have made significant achievements in construction and investment, they have exposed serious geopolitical vulnerabilities in terms of strategy and operation.
In fact, this predicament was clearly anticipated back in 2008 when the ANBOUND proposed the BRI-related strategic thoughts. Researchers at ANBOUND pointed out at the time that under the framework of land power theory, railways, with the concept that time encompassed high-speed rail, while being an alternative strategic tool to maritime power, would inevitably face significant constraints and disruptions from geopolitical challenges. Therefore, such initiatives had to be done cautiously, with strategic support and international coordination. Over a decade later, it has been proven that the concerns voiced back then have become a reality.
Since 2013, China’s BRI has been emphasizing the promotion of economic connectivity across the Eurasian continent through infrastructure interconnection. Among these, the China-Europe Railway Express has been positioned as a symbolic project, carrying the significant mission of hedging maritime risks and building a "New Silk Road".
From an economic perspective, this railway corridor is expected to moderately reduce reliance on the Strait of Melaka and maritime shipping routes, foster connections between China’s central and western regions and European markets, as well as politically showcase China’s strategic capabilities. However, driven by a "project diplomacy" mentality, the pace of railway construction in China has been too rapid, lacking careful geopolitical conflict analysis, and has shown characteristics of "extensive expansion". The main issues include:
1. Neglecting sovereignty and security conflicts: Cross-border railways involve multiple countries along the route with complex issues related to tariffs, inspection and quarantine, and security checks, making coordination extremely complicated.
2. Overly optimistic about the political environment: Insufficient evaluation on the political stances of countries like Poland and Lithuania has led to multiple disruptions along the route.
3. Imbalance between investment and returns: Significant investments have been made in railway construction, but train utilization rates remain low, with a high proportion of empty containers, making it difficult to cover transportation costs.
4. Lack of international governance mechanisms: The routes lack a special status like that of an "international canal" or "free port", making it difficult to maintain neutrality in times of conflict.
These issues, stemming from a lack of geopolitical strategic experience, have meant that these intercontinental railways have not fully realized their expected economic benefits and have failed to provide strategic stability in practice.
The history of geopolitics has long proven that railways and land-based transportation play a crucial role in strategic geopolitical planning. Unlike maritime power theory, which emphasizes the advantages of projecting resources, market access, and military force through sea routes, railways as tools of land-based power are inherently constrained by geographical barriers, sovereign borders, the risks of war, and political rivalries. This makes land-based strategies far more complex to implement than maritime ones.
The history of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which linked China and Eastern Siberia, is a microcosm of the complexities involved in land-power railway strategies. From the late 19th to the early 20th century, Tsarist Russia attempted to control Northeast Asia by building the Chinese Eastern Railway, which triggered growing alarm from Japan. The Russo-Japanese War broke out over this railway, and after the war, control over the railway was divided. As Northeast Asia continued to be a focal point of great power competition, the Chinese Eastern Railway repeatedly ceased operations due to sovereignty disputes, wartime destruction, and bloc rivalries. Its ownership changed hands multiple times, and its transport capacity was severely diminished. This historical precedent clearly demonstrates that without a neutral third-party management and security mechanism that transcends the jurisdiction of any single nation-state, even the most technologically advanced and well-funded railway cannot withstand the direct damage and indirect sanctions brought by war and geopolitical conflict.
To resolve such dilemmas, efforts must be made in both "special zone-based" and "internationalization" approaches. The so-called "special zone-based" approach refers to establishing economic and logistics parks at key points along the route, which would have multinational administrative and judicial exemptions or simplified management. By signing multilateral agreements within an international legal framework in advance, these zones would be granted "supra-sovereign" status in areas such as customs clearance, inspection and quarantine, taxation, and legal dispute resolution, allowing them to maintain independent operations even under political conflicts or sanctions pressures. Complementary to this, "internationalization" involves the creation of mechanisms through international alliances or multinational corporate models with joint participation from multiple countries. Institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) can be brought in to form a system for sharing benefits and risks. Dispute resolution should be incorporated into the international arbitration system, ensuring that all parties fulfill their commitments under the established rules.
In terms of specific route selection, it is advisable to avoid overly long or geopolitically sensitive routes. More focus could be directed towards the relatively stable and shorter Central Asia-Caspian Sea corridor. First, a direct route from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the Caspian Sea would bypass the complex situation along the China-Russia border, while leveraging the development of deep-water ports by the Caspian coastal countries. Second, a route extending through the Iran North-South Corridor to the Caspian Sea could make use of the existing railway network, but it would require reaching multilateral security and operational agreements with Iran and its neighboring countries. Both routes could establish international logistics special zones along the Caspian coast and create cross-sea intermodal links with ports in Georgia and Turkey, significantly enhancing the diversification and resilience of China-Europe freight transportation.
For the "special zone-based" and "internationalization" mechanisms to work, institutional innovation is required within the legal and governance frameworks. This will undoubtedly take time and must be carefully implemented, as the process is bound to be rather complex. In fact, the model of the Suez Canal Authority is a useful reference. It involves a joint investment and operational entity formed by relevant countries along the route and international institutions, ensuring that the passage does not become a direct target for sanctions or military action in the event of a political crisis in any one country. Additionally, the establishment of an "Eurasian Land Power Connectivity Fund" could be considered. This fund would be jointly contributed by countries along the route, regional economic organizations, and international financial institutions, providing long-term financing and political risk insurance for railway construction, special zone operations, and emergency repairs.
Final analysis conclusion:
The core of the construction of BRI’s land-based corridors depends on the security and stability of the institutional environment under China's strategic influence, rather than simply on the speed of engineering or the scale of investment. Only by granting key hubs along the route a relatively "neutral" and "supra-sovereign" status through "special zone-based" mechanisms, and achieving multilateral governance and shared risk management under the "internationalization" framework, can the geopolitical vulnerabilities be effectively addressed. This would ensure the continued smooth operation of the Eurasian overland railway in turbulent times. The failure to fully consider these geopolitical factors has led to the current predicament faced by the China-Europe Railway Express.
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Zhou Chao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.
