Against the complex backdrop of a sluggish global economic recovery, accelerating green energy transition, and surging demand for critical minerals, resource nationalism is simultaneously fermenting in Africa and South America, two regions rich in natural resources. Particularly amid intensifying geopolitical rivalries, many resource-rich countries in Africa and South America are adopting increasingly aggressive strategies to secure a larger share of profits. Researches conducted by ANBOUND indicate that strategic resources such as Africa’s bauxite and oil, and South America’s lithium and copper, have become focal points in the tug-of-war between resource-sovereign nations and international capital. As the world’s largest resource consumer and a major investor, China now faces unprecedented challenges to the security of its overseas mineral supply chains.

On one hand, the West African region is experiencing a “chain reaction” of resource nationalism. ANBOUND’s previous information tracking shows that Niger's transitional government had ordered all employees of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to leave the country by May 31. This clearly reflects the government's intent to tighten its control over the national oil industry. More recently, Guinea has reinforced its resource control through a more systematic set of policy measures. On May 9, it revoked the mining licenses of two domestic companies; on May 14, it canceled the resource concessions, including for bauxite and gold, of over 50 enterprises. Then, on May 16, it issued a suspension order for the Axis mine operated by a Chinese company; on May 20, it designated the reclaimed mining rights as part of the national strategic reserve; and on May 26, it canceled another 129 exploration licenses. This series of actions directly impacts China’s aluminum supply chain, as Guinea holds 28% of the world’s bauxite reserves, yet its mining rate is only 19%. Due to this high-reserve, low-extraction leverage, such policy volatility could lead to a more than 30% increase in China’s bauxite import costs.

On the other hand, South America is becoming the new frontier of resource nationalism. In 2023, Chile presented its National Lithium Strategy, nationalizing lithium mining rights and requiring that all new projects be joint ventures with the state-owned lithium company SQM, with foreign ownership capped at 49%. This directly affected Tianqi Lithium’s investment in the Atacama Salt Flat, which accounts for 30% of global lithium production, causing a roughly USD 1.5 billion reduction in the value of Tianqi’s stake in SQM. In Mexico, the government amended the Mining Law in 2022 to prohibit foreign investment in lithium mining. As a result, Ganfeng Lithium's RMB 1.7 billion Sonora lithium clay project was canceled, forcing the company to initiate international arbitration proceedings. Peru too is tightening resource control through taxation. A subsidiary of MMG Limited, Minera Las Bambas S.A., received a tax assessment notice from Peru for approximately USD 960 million related to an audit of its 2017 income tax, a record-setting dispute in South American mining tax history. Additionally, on June 2, Bolivia’s lithium development plans at the Salar de Uyuni suffered a major setback. The Colcha K mixed court issued a ruling suspending two large-scale lithium mining agreements signed with Chinese and Russian companies. These two deals, worth over USD 2 billion in total, involved China’s CBC consortium which includes battery giant CATL and Uranium One Group, a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom.

Researchers at ANBOUND believe that the growing spread of resource nationalism in Africa and South America is primarily driven by two key shifts, namely a revaluation of resource assets and an escalation of geopolitical competition within these regions.

Firstly, the green energy transition has significantly elevated the strategic value of minerals such as lithium and copper. According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), global lithium demand in 2040 is projected to reach 15 times the level of 2023. Meanwhile, the South American "Lithium Triangle", comprising Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia, controls 60% of the world’s lithium resources. Resource-rich countries are striving to break free from the so-called "resource curse" by nationalizing assets to gain upstream pricing power within the supply chain. Chilean President Gabriel Boric stated, "Chile cannot once again make the historic mistake of privatizing resources, and for this we will create the National Lithium Company”. His push for a “Lithium OPEC” aims to wrest lithium price-setting authority away from multinational corporations. This ambition resonates with African nations’ demands for higher profit-sharing from mineral resources. For instance, Guinea’s move to raise the profit-sharing ratio for mining companies from 15% to 35%.

Secondly, resource nationalism is shifting from unilateral actions to coordinated, alliance-based resistance. The South American “Lithium Triangle” is planning to establish a unified export mechanism, modeled after OPEC, to regulate global lithium prices. In Africa, the African Union is promoting the Africa Mining Vision, which calls on member states to adopt a unified negotiating position in resource development. This trend toward alliance-building poses a “double pressure” for resource-importing countries like China. These countries must contend not only with sudden policy changes from individual nations but also with collective efforts by resource-exporting countries to raise the threshold for cooperation. For example, the cancellation of Chile’s lithium mining contract with BYD has been widely interpreted as a strategic move to contain China’s dominance in the global new energy supply chain.

Furthermore, resource nationalism in both South America and Africa is deeply infused with populist overtones. In Chile, the Democratic Revolution party has pushed legislation to restrict foreign investment, while in Mexico, President López Obrador’s government has promoted nationalization and remarked that “Oil and lithium belong to the nation, they belong to the people of Mexico, to you, to all those who live in this region of Sonora, to all Mexicans”. This strategy of political mobilization is especially prominent amid Latin America’s “Pink Tide”. In Africa, military governments have used resource nationalism to deflect domestic tensions. After the coup in Guinea, the ruling junta leveraged resource control to craft an image as national savior, successfully shifting public attention away from economic hardship toward the defense of national sovereignty. This political instrumentalization of resource policy has significantly undermined its stability, with policy risks for enterprises rising exponentially.

ANBOUND noted that the rise of resource nationalism exposes the failure of the current international resource governance system. Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms such as the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) framework are proving inadequate in addressing systemic policy risks, while the WTO rules leave a gap in applicability when it comes to resource trade. For China, its response strategy will need to shift from a past focus on rule compliance to one of adaptive flexibility. Resource sovereignty in Africa and South America is, at its core, a natural correction of longstanding inequalities in the international division of labor. As a result, Chinese enterprises must move beyond the old mindset of “resource acquisition” and adopt a “value co-creation” model. For instance, the “resources-for-technology” cooperation model can be promoted. In South America, China can draw on BYD’s localized production experience in Brazil, i.e., exchanging battery technology transfer for lithium mining rights. In Africa, the “bauxite–alumina–electrolytic aluminum” full-industry-chain model, as seen in China-Guinea cooperation, can be scaled up to link resource development with industrial upgrading. Another example is the strategic use of international investment arbitration mechanisms. Ganfeng Lithium’s arbitration case in Mexico demonstrates that invoking dispute settlement provisions under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) can effectively restrain host countries from unilaterally breaching contracts. At the same time, Chinese companies should strengthen their understanding of host countries' legal systems to avoid pitfalls such as tax traps that weakened the capital, which Minmetals Resources faced in Peru.

Mr. Kung Chan, ANBOUND’s founder, pointed out that in facing the global reality of resource nationalism, China must not only adopt diversified strategies but also recognize that resource nationalism itself is a trend of politicizing resources. Indeed, this phenomenon is not new in world history. Previously, it was Western powers that were opposed by the Third World. Now, the roles have been reversed, and China has become one of the actors involved. This reversal adds layers of complexity to any response strategy. Therefore, while participating in the global competition for resources, China will need to significantly deepen its political engagement with resource-supplying countries. The approach of simply “not interfering in internal affairs” is, in practice, no longer effective.

Final analysis conclusion:

Resource nationalism is spreading across Africa and South America. Its rise not only exposes the shortcomings of the current international resource governance system but also represents, at its core, a natural correction of inequality in the global division of labor. As the world’s largest resource consumer and a major investor, China faces increasingly severe challenges to the security of its overseas mineral supply chains. Hence, it needs to shift its focus from rule compliance to a more flexible and adaptive approach.