After the fragmentation of global space, there is the emergence of "regional hegemonic states". I have previously discussed this topic extensively, noting that countries such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, India, Russia, South Africa, and others being defined as regional hegemonic states. When we first defined "regional hegemonic states", the world was still embroiled in debates over whether globalization would really lead to de-globalization.

Interestingly, regarding Russia, can one consider it a global power today? It would be hard to find many who would deny that now. However, in the past, there were countless mistakes and misjudgments on this matter, especially among Europeans. Of course, Vladimir Putin himself does not wish for Russia to be a regional hegemon; he has always aspired for Russia to be a global power. However, objectively speaking, Russia has become a regional hegemon, and I believe that in the future, this situation could become a geopolitical bargaining chip for the United States.

I would like to point out that, in reality, de-globalization is not merely a matter of conceptual definition. It is no longer the case that only regional hegemonic states are emerging. Countries worldwide will increasingly have to engage with numerous "regional armed organizations", even if they must do so reluctantly. This will be an unavoidable reality, as seen with entities such as Syria's Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In fact, the greater the number of such groups, the more profound their influence. This brings the theory of de-globalization into three aspects. At the top level are polarized states, such as the United States. The next tier consists of the "regional hegemonic states" mentioned earlier, such as Turkey, India, Israel, and others. The third level encompasses "regional armed organizations", which, despite lacking defined borders, governance, or state structures, they possess real existence, organizational systems, and regional influence.

Viewed through these three aspects, the world has become more chaotic. Conventional geopolitical scholarship is effectively in disarray, devolving into idle speculation. Universities across the world must now reassess and reorganize their academic content, publishing a new generation of works. I leave this task to the professors, confident that they will perform admirably. Otherwise, a new wave of young professors will rise to replace them.

Social science, after all, is a "science of the battlefield".