The new BRICS Summit was held in Kazan, Russia, from October 22 to 24, 2024. This was the first summit since the historic expansion of the BRICS cooperation mechanism the previous year. The first BRIC summit took place in 2009, joined by Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The following year, South Africa participated and officially hence the BRICS group was established. At the Johannesburg summit in 2023, the group expanded again, inviting Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to join its cooperation mechanism. After this expansion, the BRICS countries accounted for nearly half of the global population, over 30% of global GDP, and one-fifth of global trade, with an economic total, based on purchasing power parity, surpassing that of the G7.

The theme of the summit this year was "Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development And Security". The main agenda included cooperation on the new industrial revolution, global governance reform, and the implementation of global civilization initiatives. Key topics were the reform of international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to enhance the voice and representation of developing countries and emerging markets. Additionally, the summit discussed the establishment of a BRICS-led payment system proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin to compete with the Western SWIFT system, as well as the ongoing escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The summit concluded with the adoption of the Kazan Declaration, which emphasized strengthening cooperation after the BRICS expansion under three pillars: political security, economic finance, and cultural collaboration. It encouraged the enhancement of the BRICS network of correspondent banks and the implementation of local currency settlements through the non-binding BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (BCBPI). The declaration also agreed to discuss and explore the feasibility of establishing an independent cross-border settlement and custody infrastructure, known as the BRICS Clearing System (BRICS Clear), to complement existing financial market infrastructures, with voluntary participation from all parties.

The BRICS cooperation mechanism is currently the most important platform for solidarity and cooperation among emerging market countries and developing nations. It serves as a pillar for promoting a multipolar world characterized by equality and order, as well as inclusive economic globalization. Additionally, it is one of the key platforms through which China projects its influence to emerging markets and Southern countries, which carries significant expectations for China. This year’s BRICS summit was held in Russia, a country that has faced over two years of sanctions and isolation from the West due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Given that this was the first summit after the expansion of the BRICS mechanism, some Chinese commentators have high hopes for the summit, believing it will help further amplify the voice of the Global South, expand cooperation among emerging countries, and enhance their own influence and membership. It is evident that within the BRICS mechanism, both formal members and partner countries are primarily major regional powers with considerable influence. The inclusion of these countries will undoubtedly enhance the global impact of the BRICS mechanism. However, regarding the BRICS mechanism itself, its attractiveness to global regional powers appears to have reached a limit, making the potential for further strengthening quite finite.

First, there are deep-seated issues both within the core member countries of the BRICS mechanism, as well as among the members themselves. In the case of Russia, the prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict has fundamentally revealed the limitations of Russia as a "great power". The struggles of the Russian military on the battlefield, along with the bleak prospects for its economy under ongoing sanctions, indicate that Russia's ability to provide regional and global security and economic public goods in the future will be significantly constrained. Moreover, the series of failures in Russia's economic transition following the collapse of the Soviet Union suggests that even if the West were to completely lift economic sanctions against Russia, the overall outlook for its economic development would still not be promising.

In the case of China, since the lifting of its COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, the country's socioeconomic growth rate has gradually slowed, with consumer spending weakening and the real estate sector, along with local governments' massive debts, significantly dragging down economic growth. Despite multiple rounds of stimulus from the Chinese government aimed at boosting consumer spending and economic growth, there have been no significant results. Additionally, Western capital is progressively withdrawing from Mainland China and Hong Kong, while the U.S.-led technological and economic pressures on China continue. While China's fundamental economic situation is certainly much better than Russia's, the sustainability of its ability to provide economic public goods to regional powers is also in question.

Between BRICS member countries, the profound contradictions between India and China will remain a long-term challenge. Before the BRICS summit, the Indian government clearly stated that it had reached a new border patrol agreement with China, but the specific implementation process will still require time. Moreover, considering India's strategic positioning and geopolitical interests, there remain anti-China geopolitical tensions in regions such as the South Asian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. Coupled with the significant investments made by the West to court India, India's confrontational stance toward China is unlikely to undergo any substantial change due to a thaw in border issues. Additionally, India's attitude toward Russia will continue to be characterized by pure pragmatism. As a result, there is no real cohesion among the core countries of the BRICS mechanism; instead, there are deep-rooted contradictions, making it difficult for this mechanism to effectively attract and integrate other regional powers.

Second, the core countries of the BRICS mechanism have not truly outperformed Western countries in mediating regional conflicts. Last year, through China's careful mediation, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached a declaration in Beijing to normalize their relations, marking a significant step toward easing tensions in the Middle East. Following this, Iran promised to pressure the Houthis to cease their armed attacks on Saudi territory. In turn, Saudi Arabia seized the opportunity to improve its relations with Iran and intensified efforts to address the influence of Iran on various countries and armed groups in the region. Saudi Arabia resumed ceasefire negotiations with the Houthis and subsequently normalized relations with Syria, expressing support for Syria's return to the Arab League in 2023. Saudi Arabia also reopened its embassy in Lebanon and renewed contact with Iraq, signing a series of cooperation agreements in the fields of energy, investment, and infrastructure.

However, the effects of these efforts quickly proved to be extremely limited. The Houthis began to delay the signing of agreements with Saudi Arabia, and the peace process in Yemen has been frozen for some time. Damascus failed to effectively curb the large amounts of drugs smuggled into the Gulf region, leaving the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Syria largely superficial. Lebanese political elites once again rejected Saudi proposals for systematic reforms and the revival of the state-building process. After the new Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani took office, Saudi Arabia perceived him as too close to Iran, resulting in a significant slowdown in cooperation with Iraq.

In terms of relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia has expanded its engagement but has invited Iranian representatives to virtually none of the meetings it has organized regarding the Gaza situation since the special summit concluded. Additionally, while Saudi Arabia has sought to reduce hostility between Western nations and Iran, it has also collaborated with the U.S., Jordan, the UK, and France to intercept over 300 drones and ballistic missiles fired by Iran at Israel in retaliation for attacks on its embassy in Syria. Despite some improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations, a deep competitive dynamic persists as both countries strive for dominance in the Middle Eastern world. Neither Saudi Arabia, as a participant in the BRICS mechanism, nor China, as a key member of the BRICS group, has managed to consistently advance the de-escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran or alleviate regional conflicts.

In the perception of the Saudi elite, the view that "the U.S. is unreliable but indispensable to us" has become a basic consensus. Therefore, Saudi Arabia is determined to maintain and even strengthen its security cooperation with the U.S., hoping to enhance its long-term self-defense capabilities through this relationship. Saudi Arabia is not only continuing to bolster its military procurement from the U.S. but is also willing to participate in the normalization process of relations with Israel under U.S. mediation.

It can be argued that for many regional powers around the world, the geopolitical rivalry between the U.S. and China certainly provides these countries with greater "united front value" and room for maneuver. However, this does not mean that their distances from the major world powers will align uniformly. For many regional powers, Western countries, especially the U.S., with their stronger economic and financial influence, often represent a more ideal partner for cooperation. For instance, countries like Saudi Arabia, a member of the BRICS mechanism, tend to gravitate slightly closer to the U.S. even while pursuing a policy of balanced diplomacy. Moreover, it is important to note that with Iran's accession to BRICS, the organization may no longer be viewed purely as an economic cooperation entity by other regional powers. Instead, it appears to have increasingly taken on an "anti-U.S." and "anti-Western" character.

Even in matters of economic cooperation, the concepts of a BRICS payment system and a common currency, heavily promoted by Russia and Brazil, clearly emphasize "de-dollarization". In this context, joining BRICS can easily be interpreted by the U.S. and other Western countries as a "realignment", bringing with it significant political, economic, and security risks.

Moreover, as mentioned earlier, both new and old BRICS members have faced economic difficulties in recent years, leading other regional powers to worry about being exploited after joining, which would be entirely contrary to their expectations. All in all, for regional powers, joining BRICS is aimed at enhancing their bargaining power with the West, rather than bearing responsibilities for others. It is noteworthy that recently, major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan have expressed no desire to become BRICS members, and Argentina too made a similar statement earlier.

Final Analysis Conclusion:

The BRICS cooperation mechanism is an important platform that China has focused on developing to enhance its international influence and unite Southern countries. Over the past decade, it has played a significant role, and its contributions cannot be overlooked. However, due to a series of changing circumstances, it appears that the BRICS group has reached the peak of its attractiveness to regional powers, making it difficult to achieve substantial breakthroughs going forward. Therefore, for countries like China, a cautious attitude should be adopted regarding its future global influence.

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Zhou Chao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.