In earlier times, the notion of China relinquishing its standing in South and Southeast Asia seemed improbable. Under usual circumstances, the country would have been far less likely to encounter the sweeping breakdown that we observe today. Given the straightforward nature of this scenario, adhering to standard protocols could have averted the sort of dramatic geopolitical shifts.
For China, this is an issue that should have been subject to thorough analysis and early alarms. Regions encompassing Southeast Asia and the South Asian subcontinent—Vietnam, Myanmar, and India included—represent its geopolitical vulnerabilities, acting as both its strategic weak points and fracture zones in geopolitics.
It appears that China remains oblivious to or skeptical of such a potential future that I previously warned about. This includes leaders and esteemed scholars in the field of international relations, who even with ample time to assimilate and grasp the true trajectory and after navigating intricate paths and expending substantial resources, still encounter such a reality, as if it was already preordained by fate.
In the beginning, when the Belt and Road Initiative was first introduced, faced with a high-value yuan and numerous mega projects, countries including India rushed in, and the relevant departments of China felt extremely positive about this, and China projected itself as a global leader. However, as its financial resources gradually dwindled and debt issues became more prominent, the world's attitude towards China started to shift. In the current context, China not only invested its monetary resources without receiving repayment, but it also faces increased criticism and blame. Chinese departments and experts appear to have come to the realization that the idea of achieving results simply by spending money is more complex than initially believed, yet this understanding has come too late.
In the post-Zhou Enlai era, China essentially lost its understanding of Southeast Asia and India. It fails to grasp the implications of nationalism in India and Southeast Asian nations, and the future direction of this. Nor do Chinese enterprises and departments fully comprehend the longstanding special relationship between Taiwan's intelligence agencies and Southeast Asian syndicates. It understands even less of the network of Islamic political powers, as well as the connection between the democratic societies in Southeast Asia and the subcontinent with issues like corruption. There are many key issues like these, and how Chinese government departments balance these intricate relationships in geopolitics is crucial for the country itself. However, certain privileged sectors in China persistently believe that such issues in Southeast and South Asia are insignificant, or at least they believe that the situation is entirely manageable.
Nothing is further from the truth, as the region is undergoing tremendous changes.
On August 20, a series of protests took place in Myanmar's capital Naypyidaw, where demonstrators set fire to numerous Chinese businesses and stormed the Chinese embassy. This marks the largest and most serious anti-China incident since political reforms began in Myanmar. Reportedly, 32 Chinese-funded businesses were looted and set on fire in Yangon, anti-China sentiments escalated, economic losses continued to rise, and over RMB 2 billion worth of assets went up in smoke. The protest activities resulted in injuries to many Chinese individuals.
In some subsequent Chinese reports, it was suggested that there was involvement of Ari Ben-Menashe, a Canadian-Israeli businessman who was previously an employee of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate, as well as of the National League for Democracy's attempt to exert pressure on China. China also acknowledged that some Myanmar citizens hold negative impressions of China and the Chinese community, with public hostility directed towards Chinese nationals and expatriates. Additionally, the widespread telecommunications fraud activities in Northern Myanmar evoked anger toward Chinese nationals.
In the Philippines, the escalating conflict between China and the Philippines over Ren'ai Reef or Second Thomas Shoal is becoming increasingly intense. In the current situation, the Philippines has openly begun preparations for the possibility of a conflict over it. Lt. Gen. Romeo Browner Jr., the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, pointed out that the use of water cannons by the Chinese on Philippine boats constitutes an "act of war". Public opinion surveys in the Philippines indicate that 65% of Filipinos are demanding immediate military action against China.
In Thailand, a globally acclaimed tourist destination, an unexpected protest arose with the goal of shutting down businesses owned by Chinese nationals due to conflicting commercial interests. Thailand typically welcomes about 11 million Chinese tourists annually and previously held a favorable stance towards them. Hence, the substantial protest organized by Thai business proprietors has caught China off guard. In response, Chinese authorities, beyond highlighting the standard notion of "external interference", have also recognized heightened commercial rivalry, shifts in pricing, services, and various factors affecting Thai enterprises.
In Indonesia, which possesses certain anti-Chia sentiments, there was an incomprehensible sudden geopolitical friendliness between the two countries. Yet, on January 15, 2023, chaos erupted at the Chinese-owned Delong Nickel Industry Company in Indonesia, with employee dormitories being attacked with Molotov cocktails. A total of 69 protestor workers engaging in destructive activities were arrested by Indonesian authorities. Reportedly, this marked the third instance of protests and vandalism against the company in this location since 2020. Moreover, this particular protest and demonstration resulted in the death of one Chinese national. Consequently, the company has been compelled to organize its own efforts to safeguard the factory.
Of course, there are also India, which has experienced border conflicts with China resulting in significant casualties, and Cambodia's widespread criminal activities targeting Chinese individuals in Sihanoukville.
In the realm of geopolitics, tensions are still ongoing. Recently, Vietnam is set to formally invite President Joe Biden to visit the country. In fact, Vietnam had just warmly welcomed the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and the country has expressed its intention to establish an official "strategic partnership" agreement with the U.S. From the interactions between the leaders of these two countries, it is evident that the smile of the Vietnamese leaders was genuine and filled with anticipation, while their meetings with Chinese leaders often exhibit a somewhat forced smile.
From China's perspective, the present Southeast and South Asia have deviated significantly from their past. The influence China once held over the Belt and Road initiatives is diminishing, coupled with lingering debt concerns and a decline in capital exports. This has led to a crumbling presence in this historically rich and densely populated region. While China may presently hesitate to acknowledge this, the point of undeniable recognition is approaching rapidly. Inevitably, China will incur a substantial cost for its geopolitical unawareness, its blind faith in financial power, and excessive self-assuredness.
