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Monday, August 29, 2022
On Intergeneration Warfare
Kung Chan

From the immemorial past to the present day, there have always been wars. The throne of the victor, as it appears, is never permanently occupied by a single victor. This also means that there has been constant persuasion of wars that pushes humanity to keep enhancing warfare. Such a progression has continuously made us revise our understanding of wars. This is particularly important, as it determines whether humankind would arbitrarily initiate wars.

From a historical perspective, the factor that determines the victory of war has always been combat efficiency, which has never changed throughout the time. This enables us to form a theoretical basis to determine the outcome 0f wars. Genghis Khan's horde, for instance, was known for its mobility. Hence, its combat efficiency was much higher than the armies of city-states where the latter could be easily entrapped in fortresses. This largely decided the victory of the Great Khan. Britain's domination of the oceans also took advantage of mobility and efficiency thanks to its seafaring vessels. Its royal navy was indispensable in building an empire that the sun never set. However, mobility is only one factor of efficiency, and there are many other factors as well. Differences in the underlying logic of war are the fundamental reasons for the appearance of different generations of warfare.

In the first generation of warfare, the number of troops was of utmost importance.

From the era of cold weapons to the era of hot weapons, the superiority of military power has played a key role for a long period of time. Victory could simply be won through the sheer number of troops.

This was usually a kind of advantage for major powers. Although the mode of war changed and the ideas of warfare transformed, in addition to that there were new means to obtain absolute or relative military superiority, yet there was still an emphasis in such a generation on relative military superiority to gain the overwhelming advantage in the war. Perhaps it is for this reason that those countries that sought to win the war always yearned for the efficiency brought about by unification. The Qin Dynasty in China, the reunification of Germany, and even the Soviet Union in World War II are some examples of this. All of them relied on the advantage of manpower to win the wars.

Therefore, relying on relative military strength is the basic feature of the first generation of warfare. Even a side that had relatively stronger weapons and equipment might not enjoy an overwhelming advantage. With sufficient manpower, coupled with the willingness to sacrifice oneself in the war, a warring party can use the superiority of troops to win the war.

In the second generation of warfare, weapons played a more critical role.

The advancement of industrial technology brought more improvements in efficiency. This was reflected in the war through the advancement of weapons. Indiscriminate bombardment had gradually become the key factor that overwhelms the side with the superior number of troops. As a result, sophisticated weaponry came to determine the victory in the war.

Such progress, in turn, caused the intergenerational transformation of war. In the face of powerful and absolute weapons, it would be impossible to win the war merely through the military superiority of manpower. Unless the party with stronger weaponry voluntarily gave up the strategic opportunity to win the war for various reasons, from a technical point of view, the party with the advantage in weaponry would undoubtedly win.

In the second generation of warfare, countries in the world would attempt to achieve the effect of overwhelming the enemy by gaining advantages through sophisticated armament Therefore, such a generation was guided by the development of weapons and the application of new technologies. The ultimate persuasion of this generation would be the possession of various missiles and nuclear weapons.

Then, superiority in information would play a forefront role in third generation of warfare.

This is the generation that is not driven by industrial technology, but by information technology. More precisely, it is a new generation of warfare driven by system technology. With the development of science and technology, particularly thanks to the progress of information technology, not only a large number of intelligent weapon equipment systems have been introduced, such systems can be integrated on a large scale as well. As a result, new concepts of warfare have emerged. It is no longer a question of the possibility of launching a war, but if there are ideas to realize it. In such a generation, "seeing is destroying", to paraphrase an old proverb, so to speak.

The dominance of information determines precision and transparency. In terms of weapons and equipment, high-precision can destroy low-precision. Information on the battlefield, intelligence, and the coordinates of the enemy are transparent to the side with superior information, hence such a side will enjoy an overwhelming advantage.

In the third generation of warfare, there is no concept of the battlefront, but there will be the concept of the battlefield. In fact, the battlefield is all over the place, from the physical world to the virtual one. As long as it can cause damage to the enemy, anywhere can be a battlefield. For this reason, it is also called multi-domain warfare. The output and projection of high-precision firepower, including virtual attack and information output and projection, play an overwhelming decisive role. The combat mode is distributed in all directions, where large and small tactical units are integrated into a system. All these tactical units are the nodes and starting points to attack the enemy, and all of them have become integrated through the information platform.

Throughout the evolution of the world's military and warfare, the intergenerational difference in warfare has an overwhelming advantage for those who possess it. Using the third-generation combat mode against that of the second-generation, or using the second-generation against the first, all these are in fact dimensionality reduction attacks.

Taking the battlefield application of armed helicopters as an example, second-generation warfare emphasizes armed helicopters to advance with tank forces, and their main task is anti-tank. What the strategists of this kind of warfare had in mind were scenes like the wreckage strewn across Iraq's Highway of Death. However, such a scenario is completely outdated. In the minds of third-generation war planners, the new concept is that the armed helicopter should be a kind of fast-moving weapon-projection base that receives and simultaneously feeds back battlefield coordinate information, at a distance from the outer edge of the battlefield. From a relatively safe distance, it provides rapid and timely firepower projection with precise strikes, thereby destroying enemy targets at all coordinates. The elements that are targeted by such attacks would be armored targets, firepower disposal points, command posts, air defense systems, and other targets. Therefore, the armed helicopters in the second-generation war would suffer a large number of battle losses, while in the third-generation warfare they will become precise killers that provide firepower projection at any time.

After studying the "non-contact" operations, the Russian military theorist and Major-General Vladimir Slipchenko proposed the concept of "sixth generation warfare". In fact, the basic battle means of the third-generation warfare are "non-contact". Humankind has begun to realize "non-contact" combat since bow and arrows in the cold weapon era were first used. The method of "non-contact" military operation, therefore, is not the intergenerational difference of war. It remained limited to the difference in weapons and belonged to the idea of warfare in the second generation.

Based on the thought that "efficiency determines the generation of warfare", it can be seen that many modern geopolitical activities are almost equivalent to meaningless self-deception. Some war planners take pride in the ability to bombard haphazardly. The war in Ukraine shows that while one party fired at the opponent indiscriminately with a larger number of weapons, yet their very own artillery bases, ammunition depots, and command posts were completely destroyed by the precise strikes of a few rockets. The superiority of the former party, therefore, has seen the loss of its combat effectiveness.

During military exercises, armored vehicles appeared to be impressive and awe-inspiring, yet in the third generation of warfare, all these expensive equipment are mere burdens on the battlefield. They not only need the protection of infantry but also to ensure that they cannot be easily discovered. In the case that they were found by their enemies, they can be easily destroyed by precision-guided weapons.

Even to this day, numerous countries around the world are spending hefty sums of money to acquire cutting-edge weapons, hoping that these can deter their enemies. However, this is typical of second-generation warfare thought, and such an era has passed. In the third generation of warfare, it is more crucial to enhance and update the use of existing weapons, especially the combined use of systematic operations. A strategic missile worth hundreds of millions may be discovered and positioned by a cheap satellite before it could be launched. Even in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war, the use of elusive UAVs had faced impending obsolescence. In the future, large UAVs will gradually disappear. Instead, smaller UAVs will appear in large numbers, playing more of an intelligence role. They are ubiquitous and can act as consumable battlefield reconnaissance equipment. Hovering above the battlefield, they can detect and transmit battlefield data. This would then be followed by guided weapon attacks from different sides.

In fact, third-generation warfare and its military forces would not vigorously pursue the so-called advanced weapon. This is because several advanced weapons will encounter distributed assaults from multiple directions, making it impossible to win the war at all. Conversely, it places more of a strong emphasis on sensor arrays, aerospace systems, intelligence integration capabilities, as well as information and data platforms. These are the key areas for achieving distributed lethality and where the system is most effective.

The world is changing, and things will no longer be the same. In the future world, the most important military assets are information and coordinates. Undoubtedly, the focus of the understanding and education on warfare will be on this aspect. Those who comprehend this can emerge as competitors who enjoy an upper hand in warfare. In contrast, those who fail to do so will be taken advantage of by others and crushed by the great wheels of geopolitics.

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