With the Russian army fully controlling the Luhansk Oblast, the situation in the eastern Ukraine region has become clearer. Although the Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said that the occupation of Lysychansk would be Russia's last victory in Ukraine, Russia will certainly not stop at that. In the next step, the Russian army will continue to occupy the entire territory of the Donetsk region, seeking complete control of the two regions in eastern Ukraine.
Researchers at ANBOUND believe that Russia's stage goal may be to occupy the two Ukrainian states, as well as Zaporizhzhia on the southeast coast and Kherson Oblast on the south. This would allow Russia to announce the realization of the strategic goal of its "special military operation" and to negotiate with Ukraine and NATO on this basis.
For Russia, controlling, the four eastern and southern states of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea, which it annexed in 2014, would be a bargaining chip that it acquires through the two war operations. With NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's leaning toward the West, Russia wants to build a "strategic barrier" with NATO through these five states. As long as the United States and NATO do not directly go into the war, the strategy of weakening Russia by assisting Ukraine may not achieve the results that NATO hopes for. There is no doubt that Russia will face long-term and severe sanctions from the West, and will bear the long-term pressure of "denationization". However, if NATO does not directly intervene, Russia should be able to hold on to these "achievements" of the war and maintain a long-term stalemate with Ukraine and NATO.
The future of the war in Ukraine is likely to be a long-term confrontation. The Ukrainian side will continue to assault the territory of the four states occupied by Russia with guerrilla warfare and occasional counterattacks. On the other hand, Russia may occupy these territories for a long period, perhaps even repeating what it did on Crimea, i.e., pushing these states to hold referendums and then incorporating them into the Russian Federation. Under a prolonged occupation, Russia may reconstruct cities in these areas, restart the economy, and rebuild social order.
Under such circumstances, in addition to maintaining military and economic aid to Ukraine and long-term sanctions against Russia, the biggest gain for NATO countries may be the revival of NATO itself, including the joining of Sweden and Finland and the establishment of a rapid reaction force of 300,000 troops, as well as the increment of NATO's European allies in their defense spending ratio and the strengthening of a European military. However, NATO's reluctance to engage in a direct war with Russia, which would mean nuclear war, has in fact left strategic space for Russia.
Foreseeably, a Russia that has not been defeated will form a geopolitical pattern of long-term stalemate with NATO in Europe.
Will this geopolitical pattern constrain the global strategy of the United States? Will Russia's war in Ukraine weaken the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region with the core goal of restricting China?
For a long time, the American leadership has been quite confident in the position of the U.S. in the world, believing that be it China or Russia, the U.S. can handle it with ease. Such optimism stems from, on the one hand, its confidence in its status as a unipolar power and the strength of its allies. On the other hand, it also has its roots in its contempt for Russia. This can be seen from President Joe Biden's previous statement that "Russia is an economy with only nuclear weapons and oil wells, nothing else". In 2014, Arizona Republican Senator John McCain was even more blatant when he called Russia "a gas station masquerading as a country". Then-President Barack Obama also dismissed Russia, calling it a mere "regional power". Overall, since Obama, with the exception of Donald Trump, American leaders and government have generally expressed disdain for Russia and Vladimir Putin.
During the Obama era, there were debates on the question in regard to which region the United States' strategic focus should be placed in. The "traditional faction" believes that Europe and the Middle East should continue to be the focus of U.S. diplomacy. This is the region where the U.S. has many of its allies, but is also the world's major energy producer and has deep historical ties with it. However, the "Asia-Pacific faction" believes that the economic potential of the Asia-Pacific region is huge, and the 21st century is the "Asia-Pacific century". Therefore, those who support this view asserted that the U.S. should seize the opportunity here, which also allows it to contain China's rise to a certain extent. The two factions are at odds with each other, hence there were various "distraction doctrines". The traditional faction believes that the Asia-Pacific is a "distraction" from the Middle East, while the "Asia-Pacific faction" believes that counter-terrorism in the Middle East is a "distraction" from the Asia-Pacific.
Concerning such controversy, then-Vice President Biden gave the answer that in the process of "pivoting to Asia", the United States can "walk and chew gum" without ignoring the Middle East or staying away from Europe. During Obama's second term, the U.S. shifted its global strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific, and the Trump administration solidified this strategic transformation, listing China as its topmost long-term strategic competitor. This national strategic adjustment, which began with Obama and was later solidified by Trump, has been fully inherited by the Biden administration, becoming an unprecedented national security strategy recognized by both Democrats and Republicans. The U.S. geopolitical and geo-economic strategies, such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the U.S.-UK-Australia Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), are all based on China as its strategic competitor.
Under such a backdrop, the war in Ukraine initiated by Russia has objectively formed a strong interference with the U.S. global strategy, and it has become something that the U.S. and its NATO allies must deal with. As Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin said, the U.S. wants to see "Russia weakened" through Ukraine. If the war forms a long-term stalemate, its effect may be extending beyond the two warring countries, i.e., Russia and Ukraine. Researchers at ANBOUND opine that the whole of Europe will be deeply involved in it and will be dragged down for a long time.
The U.S., as the leader in NATO, will also be caught in this quagmire, and at least a considerable part of its attention and resources will be devoted to responding to the "imminent threat" of Russia. That said, the U.S. still can insist on "walking and chewing gum". While confronting Russia, it will still pay close attention to its long-term strategic competitor China, which is also its biggest challenger.
However, can the U.S. really easily cope with two geopolitical games simultaneously in Europe and Asia, and when its opponents are Russia and China? In our view, the actual situation may not be as easy as what the U.S. claims. As strategic intimidation, the U.S. has issued a warning to both China and Russia. While this is might not be much of a problem, if implemented as a strategy, the U.S. will need to prepare for the worst to deal with extreme situations. This, in any case, will not be easy.
The war in Ukraine has triggered changes in the global geopolitical pattern and brought a new geopolitical environment to China. As the U.S. now needs to pay more attention to the situation in Europe, its strategic actions in the Indo-Pacific will inevitably be affected to some extent. If the war is in a stalemate for a long time, the containment of NATO will also exist for a long period as well. All in all, the war has a certain strategic diversion effect on China in the short term.
However, this does not mean that the strategic environment China faces has fundamentally changed. If anything, the war in Ukraine has increased the geopolitical alertness of European countries toward China. The NATO summit in Madrid adopted a new "strategic concept", claiming that China poses a challenge to NATO's interests, security, and values, and the NATO allies will jointly address China's "systemic challenges". Researchers at ANBOUND believe that NATO's redefinition of China is a geopolitical "preventive strategy" promoted by the U.S., i.e., first defining China as an important potential threat, and then under this definition in the future, restricting China to a certain extent.
How then, should China respond to this geopolitical change?
As a non-aligned developing country, China has its own independent strategic interests, which do not depend on aligning with any major power. China adheres to the existing diplomatic principles, where it formulates its own strategies, policies, and actions based on the coordination mechanism under the framework of the United Nations and its own strategic interests. In a highly geopoliticized world, China will need to adapt to changes and strive for greater strategic interests.
Under the situation of long-term stalemate and confrontation between Russia and NATO, China can in fact have more strategic space. As long as it does not make blunders in its strategies and policies, it is possible for China to play a unique role in the world. Geopolitically, China needs to become an influential stabilizing factor. Economically, it needs to become an open country as the world's factory" and the "world's market". With its huge commercial presence, China has maintained critical economic relations with Russia, G7, ASEAN, and other countries and regions, which is an important development position that conforms to the interests of many parties.
Such would be the roles and positions that China needs to assume in the new global geopolitical and geo-economic development.
Final analysis conclusion:
The war in Ukraine has brought major changes to the world. Facing these changes, China will need to understand the situation, so as to seize the time window to reduce the risks and maintain stable economic growth. This is China's role in the changing international arena, and its contribution to the world.
