The sentiment of general public determines the degree of support of a society towards a leadership, and this is especially crucial for the military’s morale and its enduring combative effectiveness. Behavioral psychology has long held that psychological conditions are manipulable and controllable. Indeed, a set of skills and mature practices of this have long existed.
The morale of the Taiwanese military is regularly reviewed within the island itself. A Taiwanese military officer who has served in Penghu for more than a decade said that he is still proud of being a soldier and believes that the morale in the military is not as bad as what the outsiders think. However, having the experience in assisting the recruitment of soldiers, he admitted that it is difficult to recruit new soldiers. The biggest reason is that soldiers’ social status in Taiwan is not considered to be high, and if soldiers make any mistakes, they are often disproportionately magnified, resulting in a poor perception of the general public on the military. Because of this, many parents do not wish their children to join the military.
Lu Lishi, the Taiwanese veteran mentioned above, concluded that the Taiwanese society’s current perception of soldiers has its historical origins. During the period when the Nationalist Government first relocated to Taiwan, many grass-roots soldiers had low education standards, so there was a widespread stereotype that a person should not serve as a soldier, as it is not regarded as a respectable profession.
He also added that modern society often sees soldiers from a moral high ground, and does not permit them to make mistakes. Any mistake of the part of the soldiers will be enlarged by the media reports, and this is unfair to soldiers.
Lu Lishi told Deutsche Welle that as the military is receiving much attention now, it is an opportunity for it reform, though it would still be hard to undo the stereotype, and this will not be solved in a short time. He also stated that the people do have high expectations on the soldiers, and at the same time that the soldiers must also have the ability to defend the homeland, and this require actual capability.
The Taiwan authorities seem to be aware of this situation. Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly stated the need to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities so that the people will have confidence in the military and proud to be soldiers. However, this is yet to be shown in the Taiwanese military. Lu Lishi said that building confidence in self-defense is not about slogan, but actual actions.
At present, there are gaps between Taiwanese and American theory and practice in military training.
First of all, theoretically, there are those who believe that the strength of the army lies in strict discipline and high standard. Historical realism has in fact long revealed that this theory is outdated. For the Israeli army when it was just founded, or the guerrillas during the Mao Zedong era, they were not considered to be have high-standard. The Iraqi and Afghan forces received large amount of military equipment because of the United States' efforts to organize training, but they were all defeated. The key therefore, lies in the support of the people. This is the fundamental theory of any military organization, yet it has not been seriously researched and treated.
Secondly, the army itself is an important factor. During the Nazi Germany era, Hitler could not completely control the German army. The German army had a long history of its own culture and traditions. However, the German army was used by Hitler and it became loyal to him. What made the German army which was led by a number of senior officers to go to the battlefields, and what promoted young blood to join the army, was Hitler's means to win the people’s heart. Such effort, under the manipulations of Joseph Goebbels, became highly successful, and it was because of this that even if the Nazi German army did not perform well, it was fierce in combats.
Therefore, in assessing the issue of China’s cross-strait matters, the conclusion and perspective provided by historical realism is that the key to success or failure at this stage is mainly on winning the heart of the people between the two sides of the strait. In this competition, whoever wins will actually achieve absolute victory. It is definitely not merely about encouraging military personnel to wear military uniforms on the streets to boost their morale, nor is it what the U.S. military thought now, i.e. having training and weapons and equipment would be sufficient enough.
During World War II, some American scholars stationed in China, such as John Stewart Service and others, actually realized the existence of this problem, but it is uncertain why they did not focus their theoretical research on this aspect, and only presented it to the U.S. government as a "personal judgment". Later, they would engage in their own research interests. Most of these scholars who conducted historical research did not make more theoretical contributions to the training experience of the U.S. military. Perhaps in the future world, there might be high-level military and political circles within the U.S. who realize the decisive significance of this issue.
