When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced the idea of a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) to the heads of state of Australia, India, and the United States at a side meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum Summit in May 2007, his vision was to forge a coalition of democracies to counterbalance China (PDF) in the Indo-Pacific. Eighteen years later, it's not clear that the initiative has been a success.

The objectives of Abe's proposal covered national security and diplomacy, ranging "from promotion of democracy and collaboration on homeland security to joint disaster-response operations and building greater military interoperability." It initially received support from India and the United States, which were strengthening ties through a nuclear fuel agreement and viewed the QSD as a means for India to forge closer relationships with U.S. allies. Australia was, however, hesitant, being concerned about the addition of a country, India, that it saw as a weaker partner, to an ongoing robust trilateral security dialogue between Australia, Japan, and the United States.

The timing turned out to be poor. Abe resigned as prime minister of Japan in September 2007. By that time, China and several ASEAN nations had expressed concerns that the QSD aimed to establish an exclusive security framework in their region. Australia, under newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, prioritized deepening trade relations with China. Meanwhile, the United States entered the Great Recession and sought economic cooperation with Beijing. India, wary of antagonizing China and competing with ASEAN, remained cautious. When Australia withdrew from the next QSD meeting in February 2008, the initiative seemed doomed, with Japan left as its sole advocate.

Revived in November 2017 by the United States, the Quad by then had more willing partners. India had faced a military standoff with China in Doklam that summer, and Australia was grappling with Chinese influence operations. Largely to accommodate India's continued concerns about antagonizing China, however, the group renamed itself as the Quad. It distanced itself from overt security objectives, instead emphasizing support for a "rules-based order" and humanitarian efforts.

To clarify that support for a rules-based order did not involve military action, the Quad declared that all its activities would be planned with ASEAN's three goals in mind: "support for ASEAN centrality, ASEAN-led regional architecture, and ASEAN's adoption of its Indo-Pacific Outlook (PDF)." The latter contained a key condition: It called for dialogue and cooperation rather than rivalry.

An important aspect of the Quad that should not be ignored is how public its posture has always been regarding its proposed activities. This would not have been necessary had the objective been just to discuss the China threat. Instead, the public posture seems to be a way of undertaking public diplomacy in the target countries. By doing so, it committed the Quad to being accountable to the public of the target countries in the provision of the public goods promised.

How well has the Quad fulfilled its role as a public goods provider? The list of proposed public goods initiatives of the Quad has been vast in scope. Starting with humanitarian disaster aid, a second area, pandemic support, was added in 2020 after the COVID-19 pandemic began. With each subsequent Quad meeting, the list was further expanded. The Quad's mission commits it to delivering resources for education fellowships, cancer research, the development of ports, coast guard training, tracking maritime activity in the South China Sea, solar cell production, regional connectivity infrastructure (digital and physical), AI in agriculture, research and development in critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, climate management, and semiconductor supply chain reliability—all of which are designed to "support the Indo-Pacific."

Despite this ambitious agenda, financial commitments have been modest. Aside from COVID-19 vaccine aid, total funding for these initiatives has amounted to less than $50 million. Why has the Quad struggled to deliver meaningful public goods?

Some major obstacles stand out. First, the nature of public goods delivery in the region limits what an external grouping like the Quad can effectively provide. Public goods differ in their geographical impact and require matching resolutions—cross-border pollution, for example, is best handled bilaterally or through trusted regional institutions like ASEAN, which has a strong track record in resolving bilateral issues. Similarly, global public goods, such as climate change mitigation, require adherence to international agreements rather than separate Quad-led efforts.

However, the Quad could add value in areas that are regional public goods, particularly where ASEAN lacks adequate capacity, such as pandemic response, STEM education, maritime security, disaster relief, and regional connectivity. Yet progress in these areas has been slow, highlighting further obstacles. One is ASEAN's concerns about activities that could have more than their stated purposes. Maritime security efforts, for example, have stalled due to ASEAN nations' fears that the Quad's real objective is monitoring China, an endeavor they prefer to avoid.

Second, the adequacy and efficient use of resources has been a concern. One of the Quad's most prominent pledges—COVID-19 vaccine distribution—highlighted its shortcomings. While the Quad committed to supplying 1.2 billion doses by the end of 2022, only 290 million were delivered. In contrast, China provided 1.65 billion doses during the same period, and the United Nations–backed COVAX initiative delivered nearly 2 billion. This failure to meet expectations reinforced perceptions of Quad underfunding and inefficacy.

Another underwhelming initiative is the Quad Fellowship, which provides a $20,000 stipend per student for graduate STEM studies in the United States (with Japan set to join). However, only 50 students received funding in 2024, amounting to a mere $1 million outlay. Moreover, 80 percent of the funds went to students of the Quad countries, and ASEAN students received just 20 percent. China, by contrast, offers a far more extensive, multi-billion-dollar education program supporting 30,000 Southeast Asian students for study in China annually, alongside in-country campuses, research sponsorship, and faculty exchanges.

The Quad's limited financial commitment may stem from domestic political constraints, with member nations prioritizing bilateral aid over regional Quad-backed initiatives. However, for Southeast Asian audiences, this lack of investment signals a lack of interest. This, in turn, lends credence to China's argument that the Quad's real purpose is containment rather than regional development. Consequently, ASEAN nations remain as hesitant (PDF) about the Quad today as they were at its inception.

Returning to the question posed at the outset: Has the Quad failed? The contrast between the Quad's sustained enthusiasm for high-profile meetings and its weak record of public goods delivery suggests a disconnect. While the Quad may succeed in generating diplomatic attention, its tangible impact on Southeast Asia remains minimal. Perhaps the publicity is enough for the Quad to consider itself a success—unfortunately, for Southeast Asia, it may not be enough at all.

Rafiq Dossani is a senior economist at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

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