On December 20, 2025, Japan and the five Central Asian nations held the inaugural summit of the "Central Asia plus Japan" Dialogue (CA+JAD) in Tokyo. This marks the first time in 21 years， since Japan launched the mechanism in 2004， that the framework has been elevated from the ministerial to the heads-of-state level. The summit saw the adoption of the "Tokyo Declaration" and the launch of the "Tokyo Initiative"， establishing a cooperation framework centered on green and resilient development, connectivity, and human resource training. Accompanying these initiatives is a target to implement commercial projects totaling approximately JPY 3 trillionover the next five years, with a substantial number of concrete projects and financing arrangements finalized during the summit and the concurrent business forum. Judging by this summit and recent developments, Japan’s comprehensive strategy toward Central Asia now exhibits a systematic structure characterized by "institutional upgrading, initiative-led guidance, project-based support, and financial coordination". However, from a structural perspective, the scale of cooperation, geographical constraints, and the depth of regional integration are not yet sufficient to serve as a substantive substitute for, or pose a fundamental challenge to, the existing China-Central Asia cooperation mechanisms or China’s established economic and security influence in the region. Nonetheless, because this round of cooperation moves beyond symbolic dialogue and begins to penetrate critical sectors, such as critical minerals, logistics corridors, financial instruments, and institutional alignment, there are still certain potential structural impacts and long-term spillover effects.
First, there is the potential impact of Japan-Central Asia cooperation on China’s critical resource and supply chain landscape. At the resource and supply chain level, Japan has placed "strengthening critical mineral supply chains" at the strategic core of its cooperation framework. It has explicitly moved to advance exploration, development, processing, and long-term supply arrangements for key resources such as uranium, rare metals, and gallium. The strategic intent behind this is clear, i.e., against a backdrop of persistent tensions in Japan-China relations and rising uncertainty surrounding export controls on critical minerals, Japan seeks to establish a procurement channel in Central Asia that is relatively independent of China. The goal is to mitigate the risk of structural dependency on a single source. Through government-affiliated agencies and major general trading companies or sōgō shōsha, Japan is pushing rare metal exploration in Kazakhstan and has initiated its first imports of rare metals required for semiconductor materials from the region. By deepening long-term involvement in uranium and precious metal resources through entities such as JOGMEC, Itochu, and Mitsui, Japan is directly targeting China’s global dominance in specific critical mineral categories. These moves may weaken China’s marginal bargaining power in these sectors.
At the same time, Japan’s emphasis on "full-chain cooperation" that encompasses everything from resource exploration and processing to logistics and financial support may encourage Central Asian nations to further diversify their resource export structures and partner portfolios. In the medium-to-long term, this could increase the competitive intensity and institutional friction costs China faces when securing certain critical resources. However, resource development in Central Asia remains heavily dependent on existing transport and infrastructure systems dominated by China and Russia in terms of technology, capital, and market off-take. China maintains a distinct comprehensive advantage through its large-scale investment capacity, complete industrial supply chains, and robust downstream demand absorption. As for now, Japan’s strategy is more of a "supplementary positioning" rather than a "systemic substitution". Consequently, its impact is more likely to manifest as an external constraint on China and a diversification of risk, rather than a substantive restructuring of the global resource landscape.
Second, Japan’s involvement in Central Asian connectivity might impact China’s land corridor layout. Japan has explicitly backed the "Middle Corridor" or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route connecting to Europe via the Caspian Sea. By leveraging Official Development Assistance (ODA), upgrades to customs clearance equipment, digital customs solutions, and personnel training, Japan is promoting the construction of Eurasian logistics routes that bypass Russia. The core objective is to mitigate the impact of geopolitical uncertainty on supply chains and establish new strategic transit options in the heart of Eurasia. This route aligns closely with the Western political narrative of sanctions against Russia and "de-risking" strategies. To a certain extent, it also creates a potential diversionary relationship with the China-led China-Europe Railway Express and associated land corridors. Should the relevant infrastructure continue to improve, cargo flows that are highly sensitive to lead times, compliance requirements, and political risks may indeed shift toward these diversified routing options. In the long run, this could marginally affect China’s relative dominance over Central Asian logistics hubs and international rule-setting.
However, when it comes to the actual operational conditions, the "Middle Corridor" still faces significant shortcomings in terms of transport capacity, logistics costs, cross-border coordination efficiency, and adaptability to climatic and geographical challenges. Its long-term stability is heavily dependent on complex multilateral political coordination and continuous capital investment. In the short term, it is unlikely to serve as a substantive substitute for the mature land corridors passing through China. The impact on the overall Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) layout of China is more akin to the addition of an alternative route, and for the time being, it will not drastically alter the landscape of the primary transport corridors.
Third, Japan’s use of financial and institutional tools to enhance its presence in Central Asia has its effects as well. Compared to the more fragmented project-based cooperation of the past, Japan has significantly strengthened the coordinated application of policy finance, development assistance, and institutional arrangements in the region. Key players, including Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), multilateral industrial banks, and major general trading companies, are entering the market simultaneously. They are advancing financing arrangements totaling billions of dollars in key nations such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By establishing intergovernmental committees for trade and economic cooperation, exploring Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for Japanese investors, and formulating cooperation blueprints leading up to 2030, Japan is attempting to elevate bilateral cooperation from the project level to the institutional level. This approach of leveraging financial tools as a catalyst and using rules and mechanisms as a bond serves to increase Japan’s visibility and agenda-setting power within Central Asian policy circles. It may also create institutional inertia in favor of Japanese cooperation in specific sectors, indirectly squeezing the institutional space available to China in certain niche areas.
Nonetheless, compared to the multi-layered, integrated structure of "trade volume—infrastructure—industrial chains—security cooperation" that China has already established in Central Asia, Japan’s institutional intervention remains concentrated. Japan’s engagement is primarily focused on financial support, governance improvements, and flagship demonstration projects. It lacks the support of a broad industrial hinterland and the capacity for large-scale market absorption. Consequently, Japan’s influence is more likely to manifest as "point-based reinforcement and selective deepening" rather than a systemic, region-wide expansion.
Finally, the geopolitical implications of Japan-Central Asia cooperation and its spillover effects on Chinese influence. At the geopolitical level, Japan intends to embed its Central Asian policy within a broader Western strategic framework. It achieves this by repeatedly emphasizing the region's "strategic importance" and a "free and open international order based on the rule of law", while maintaining high discursive alignment with the U.S. and Europe. Through this approach, Japan seeks to secure a strategic presence in a region where Chinese and Russian influence heavily intersect. Objectively, these actions may increase the complexity of major-power dynamics in Central Asia. They risk imbuing certain economic cooperation issues with political or "bloc-based" overtones, potentially introducing more external variables and interference when China seeks to advance its own pragmatic cooperation in specific scenarios.
That being said, the five Central Asian nations have long pursued a "multi-vector" balanced diplomacy. Their core policy orientations remain focused on economic development, social stability, and risk diversification. Hence, they lack the practical incentive to pivot entirely toward any single power. For Central Asian states, Japan’s involvement is viewed primarily as a tool to increase their bargaining chips and expand their cooperation options, rather than as a strategic patron that could fully replace China or Russia. Structurally, this creates a natural constraint on the spillover of Japan’s geopolitical influence.
All in all, the upgrading of the Japan-Central Asia cooperation mechanism does not represent a single-dimensional direct impact on China’s regional influence. Rather, it constitutes a structural disturbance formed by the convergence of multiple marginal channels, including resource supply, logistics routes, financial institutions, and strategic discourse. Its primary effect is to expand the room for maneuver and the bargaining power of Central Asian nations in their external partnerships. It is not yet sufficient to shake the systemic advantages, deep economic integration, and long-standing foundation of cooperation that China has established in the region. Yet, it will, to a certain extent, increase the complexity and the coordination costs for China as it advances its regional agenda. Furthermore, following the Japanese general election and the preliminary consolidation of the LDP’s one-party dominance in Japan, the country's subsequent determination and resolve in executing its Central Asian strategy should not be underestimated.
Final analysis conclusion:
The convening of the first Japan–Central Asia leaders’ summit marks Japan’s formal incorporation of Central Asia into a key direction of its long-term external economic and security strategy. The upgrade in cooperation is characterized more by a “complementary entry” within the existing great-power structure than by a “subversive restructuring”. For China, this development brings potential competitive pressures in areas such as critical minerals, logistics corridors, and institutional influence. At the same time, it provides a practical reference point for reassessing and optimizing the structure and pace of China–Central Asia cooperation. With this in mind, China’s option is to continue consolidating its comprehensive advantages in energy, infrastructure, and trade. It should also place greater emphasis on supply chain resilience, regulatory alignment, and the quality of cooperation, and properly respond to new variables arising from Central Asian countries’ trend toward diplomatic diversification. In this process, adopting an open and pragmatic attitude toward the involvement of external actors, including Japan, avoiding the over-securitization of normal competition, and exploring limited third-party cooperation and functional complementarity where feasible may instead help consolidate China’s long-term influence in Central Asia and stabilize expectations for regional cooperation.
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Zhou Chao is a Research Fellow for Geopolitical Strategy programme at ANBOUND, an independent think tank.
