Over the past several decades, the global green transition has been regarded as a crucial pathway for climate governance and economic restructuring. However, developments since 2020 have shown that this process is facing a reversal, which is largely caused by the "politics of cost". As energy prices fluctuate, inflation remains high, and the financial burden on the middle class grows, the high-cost nature of green policies has begun to trigger political backlash in most developed countries. In the United States, the Trump administration, under the pretext of safeguarding against inflation and job protection, has weakened or shelved green transition goals. Although major EU member states continue to uphold green initiatives, mounting pressure from domestic conservative forces is increasing uncertainty about the future. Meanwhile, ESG mechanisms, which were previously a major driver of the green transition, are now facing the accusations of "greenwashing", further eroding their credibility. All in all, the global green agenda is gradually moving from a grand narrative into a cooling period of political competition.

Against this backdrop, China's green transition has shown a distinctive sense of continuity. It is driven not only by the fulfillment of international commitments, but also by strong internal imperatives, where it needs to address the country's own air pollution, ease healthcare burdens, and upgrade industrial structures. This "transition of necessity" provides a realistic foundation for China to advocate a "de-politicized global green coalition" on the international stage.

According to ANBOUND's strategic forecast, advancing a global "green alliance" is objectively feasible for China.

First, a "vacuum period" in global green governance is gradually emerging. Since the U.S. government scaled back green subsidy policies under inflationary pressure, a clear leadership gap has appeared in the global climate governance system. Although Europe has institutionally maintained its carbon market and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), its internal political landscape has become fractured: right-wing forces in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and other countries are all calling for delays to energy taxation and carbon-reduction requirements. With soaring energy prices, manufacturing outflows, and a public backlash, the "green agenda" is increasingly being redefined as an economic burden.

Under such a background, Nordic countries like Norway, Sweden, and Finland have been able to maintain their green policies thanks to relatively clean energy structures and solid fiscal conditions. However, their limited scale makes it difficult for them to exert global influence. This creates room for China to step in. If China can engage with a "non-politicized and pragmatic" posture and rebuild cross-regional platforms for green cooperation, it stands a strong chance of establishing institutional leadership in the next round of global public-goods provision.

Second, there are structural constraints stemming from pollution and health pressures within China. The core driver of China's commitment to a green transition lies in the rigid need for pollution control. According to data from the country's Ministry of Ecology and Environment, in 2024 the proportion of good-air-quality days in key cities nationwide reached 86.5%, a significant improvement compared with 2015, yet average PM2.5 concentrations still remain well above the latest guidelines issued by the World Health Organization. Air pollution has become one of the hidden sources of financial pressure on China's healthcare system. Studies indicate that deaths from respiratory and cardiovascular diseases attributable to air pollution number in the millions annually.

Therefore, China's green transition is not merely about fulfilling international commitments; it is an intrinsic requirement for domestic sustainable development. Precisely because of this endogenous driver, the country enjoys greater credibility when advocating international green cooperation, in the sense that it is not exporting ideology, but extending its own logic of public health and survival.

At the same time, there is strategic feasibility for China to take the lead in building a global green alliance.

China's existing policy framework and international initiatives provide strong continuity for further expansion. In recent years, China's "green diplomacy" has begun to take shape. Since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) entered its phase of "green and high-quality development", around 100 countries have participated in cooperation projects involving green energy, clean transportation, and ecological protection. China's launch of the Belt and Road Green Development Partnership Initiative (2021) and the Global Clean Energy Cooperation Partnership Initiative (2023) has laid an institutional foundation for building a broader green alliance.

Building on this foundation, a "non-politicized global green alliance" could be structured around technology, finance, and standards as the principal bonds of cooperation, rather than political alignment as a precondition. Potential members could include East Asian countries (China, Japan, and South Korea), which share ecological risks and industrial complementarities; Nordic nations (Norway, Finland, and Sweden), which can contribute institutional and financial experience; selected Middle Eastern oil-producing states (such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia), which are actively seeking new investments in energy transition; and emerging economies in Southeast Asia and Africa, which have strong demand and an open attitude toward technological cooperation.

Through an integrated approach combining a "technology standards + green finance mechanism", together with an "education and exchange network", China can build a cooperation-oriented multilateral framework that strengthens global green governance without challenging the existing international order.

In addition, China has competitive advantages in technology and industrial systems. Its leading position in the renewable energy and electric vehicle supply chains provides a critical material foundation for building a global green alliance. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2025 report, China accounts for over 50% of global production capacity in photovoltaic modules, power batteries, and wind power equipment. At the same time, the country's large-scale costs in energy storage, electrolytic hydrogen production, and heat pump technologies are significantly lower than those in Europe and the U.S.

This cost advantage not only enhances the alliance's attractiveness but also enables China to supply "technological public goods". For example, photovoltaic power plants invested by Chinese firms in South Asia and Africa have unit costs 20%-40% lower than those of European and American companies, while providing stable operation and maintenance support. This means that by exporting "low-cost green technologies", China can incorporate developing countries into the alliance framework, giving them a voice in international climate negotiations and laying the groundwork for a "green Global South bloc".

Another crucial aspect is green finance and capital linkage mechanisms. The high cost of green transition has been a key factor behind the retreat of Western policies, yet it also presents an opportunity for China to pioneer institutional innovation. Yuan-denominated green financial instruments such as green bonds, green loans, and carbon-related derivatives are gaining increasing international acceptance. In 2024, China's green bond issuance neared RMB 700 billion, ranking among the highest globally.

Building on this foundation, China could explore establishing a "Green Investment Fund Alliance", initiated by it and jointly participated in by select East Asian and Nordic countries, which can potentially create a depoliticized capital channel. This would simultaneously meet developing countries' infrastructure financing needs and enhance China's institutional influence in the global green capital market.

The final aspect to consider is the reconstruction of international communication and soft power. Building a green alliance is not only an economic agenda but also a means of reshaping "discourse politics". In the current international media landscape, China often responds passively to climate issues rather than setting the agenda proactively. By positioning "green public goods" as the central theme of its international communication, China could feasibly propose a "Global Green Consensus Platform" at forums such as UN Climate Conferences, G20 energy meetings, and APEC green cooperation mechanisms, advancing transnational cooperation through non-sensitive channels such as technical standards, youth exchanges, and climate education.

The advantage of this approach is that it subtly embeds international political influence into concrete operational channels, creating "soft, minimally ideological political leverage". As noted earlier, as long as a global green platform exists, China's voice is naturally amplified.

However, in the real world, while China has a solid foundation to promote a global green alliance, it still faces three key risks: some countries may perceive China-led green mechanisms as extensions of geopolitical expansion; Western nations continue to control many critical certification systems and intellectual property rules; and if green investment cycles are too long or returns too low, China's fiscal and financial capacity could be strained.

That being said, given the window of opportunity created by shifting attitudes among major Western powers toward global green alliances, China can seize the moment to actively participate. Relevant strategies could include co-hosting sector-specific projects with multiple countries to reduce the perception of "China-led" initiatives and establish a "weakly centralized" structural mechanism; allowing Western capital to participate as observers or project investors to ensure openness; and prioritizing areas such as energy storage, carbon trading standards, and ecological restoration, which are less politically sensitive.

Through these mechanisms, China could leverage green issues to reshape the multilateral system within a framework of "cooperative internationalism", thereby expanding its institutional influence under conditions of minimal or non-confrontation.

As conservatism rises and inflationary pressures intensify, the global green transition is shifting from a broad consensus toward the domain of a committed minority. At this historical turning point, China, Japan, South Korea, and the Nordic countries may become "green islands". Yet it is precisely the existence of these islands that provides a new starting point for global green cooperation.

If China can advance the construction of a "Global Green Alliance" with a pragmatic and non-politicized approach, it would not only create strategic space for the country's own domestic energy security and industrial upgrading, but also establish a form of new leadership in the provision of international public goods. A green alliance is not a traditional political bloc; rather, it is an international governance structure rooted in shared interests and common survival pressures. In this sense, China's green transition is not only a domestic necessity but also an opportunity for shaping the international order. True political wisdom lies in embedding politics within non-political endeavors, and the "green alliance" exemplifies precisely this kind of political art.

Final analysis conclusion:

The global green transition is shifting from a political slogan to a matter of practical negotiation, and China possesses unique structural advantages in this process: it has the support of industrial chains and technological systems, as well as endogenous momentum driven by domestic ecological pressures. The global retreat from green policies means that China's persistence represents not only the continuation of environmental policies but also a strategic positioning for the future global governance landscape. By promoting a depoliticized, pragmatic global green alliance, China can reshape international discourse through the provision of public goods, transitioning from a "passive participant" to an "architect of institutions". This pathway may become the most sustainable form of influence China can exert within the international system in the latter half of the 21st century.